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Abstract 
There are many ways of describing the quantitative risk assessment (QRA) methodology, 
but in general, the basic steps include: System Definition, Hazard Identification, 
Frequency Analysis, Consequence Modeling, and Risk Calculations and Assessment. The 
present study is aimed at the Consequence Analysis, which was an integral part in the 
QRA for the transportation of ammonia by rail from Gurun to Port Klang. The software 
package SAFETI has been used to model the resulting behavior of the released ammonia 
and the extent of the damage expressed in terms of distance to certain effect levels. 
Besides, sensitivity analysis was also carried out to identify the impacts of atmospheric 
conditions on ammonia gas dispersions. The results indicated an increase in the ammonia 
gas dispersion distances for releases at higher atmospheric temperatures of lower 
atmospheric humidity (e.g. for rupture case with wind speed 3m/s, at 15oC, the 
dispersion distance was 835.4 m, while at 35oC, it increases to 866.2 m). However, 
further analysis of the effects atmospheric humidity on the ammonia gas dispersions was 
required to determine the differences in the trend for the 25 mm and 100 mm leak cases 
compared to the rupture case. 
Keywords: Consequence Analysis, Quantitative Risk Assessment, Rail, Transportation 
of Ammonia, Sensitivity Analysis. 
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1.0 Introduction 
Rail is favored as one of the means of transport medium compared to other modes due to 
its ability to carry large loads. A series of road accidents in Germany in the late 1980’s 
prompted the country to implement measures aimed at transferring certain long haul 
dangerous goods transport from road to rail or other means. Such effort also influenced 
other countries, as well as the member countries of the European Union, to review road 
versus rail safety issues [1]. Since then, there has been a steady increase in the use of 
railways as the means of transport of hazardous materials throughout the world [2]. 
However, as with road and other transport modes, there have been many occurrences of 
rail/train accidents involving releases of hazardous materials. The National 
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) in the USA reported that 1986 was a tragic year for 
the rail transportation industry [3] because there were 17 rail accidents occurred in that 
year and resulted in 19 fatalities, 230 injured and over $64 million US dollars in damage. 
Based on the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) 1987 - 1992 Report [4], from the 
year 1981 to 1991, an average of 12% of the total accidents resulted in a release of 
hazardous material, whilst 50% of these releases, on average resulted in evacuation of 
people in the surrounding areas. Although the likelihood of a hazardous material release 
based on the data presented above is low, the potential impact of the release to the 
surrounding population is significant in which one out of every two incidents involving a 
hazardous material release resulted in severe effects to the population. 
Corresponding information provided in the annual reports of the NTSB, 1979 and 1991 
[5] states that the breakdown of fatalities due to accidents by commodity type is typically 
as follows: Gasoline 32.5 %; LPG 21.7 %; Chlorine 9.6 %; Corrosive Liquids 9.6 %; 
Ammonia 6 %; Aviation Fuel 2.4 %; Compressed Gas 2.4 %; and others 15.6 %. Such 
information indicates that hazardous materials, like gasoline, LPG, chlorine and corrosive 
liquids are major causes of fatality following a rail accident releases. However, of all 
these hazardous materials, the risks from chlorine and ammonia releases are considered 
to be the worst, since both of these toxic gases are capable of spreading large distances 
with significant toxic gas concentrations and causing harmful effects to people.  
In Malaysia, there have been no reported cases of ammonia rail accidents, due to the 
limited use of rail as a means to transport ammonia. The only known rail transportation 
mode of ammonia in Malaysia is the current transportation of anhydrous liquefied 
ammonia from the Petronas Fertilizers Kedah (PFK) plant in Gurun (Northern part of 
Peninsular Malaysia) to the Chemical Company of Malaysia (CCM) fertilizer facilities in 
Port Klang (South-western part of Peninsular Malaysia), with 450km length of track 
route. On the basis of the potential significant effects of ammonia toxic gas releases to the 
surrounding population and its possible outcomes as highlighted in the historical 
ammonia accidents [6-8], this study is devoted to the undertaking of the consequence 
analysis of the ammonia rail accidents for the above mentioned route. In addition, 
sensitivity analysis is also conducted to identify the impacts of atmospheric conditions on 
ammonia gas dispersions. The consequence modelling results from this study are 
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intended to combine with the results from failure frequency analysis [9], in order to be 
used as an input in the QRA for the transportation of ammonia. 
2.0 Literature Review 
 
2.1 Risk of Hazardous Materials Transportation by Rail 
In the transportation industry, quantitative risk assessments (QRA) have been used as a 
tool to help determine the safest route for the transportation of hazardous materials [10]. 
Among the studies carried out on hazardous materials transportation, most have been 
centred on materials such as chlorine, LPG and gasoline [2] [11]. The use of QRAs in the 
transportation industry, mainly for the transportation of hazardous materials by rail has 
been applied vigorously in recent years due to the concerns that most of the rail 
transportation routes are located close to heavily populated areas and the risks posed by 
the transported hazardous materials to the surrounding populations along the 
transportation route. Besides, case histories have also shown that the risks of hazardous 
materials during transport may present additional risks in addition to those associated 
with the inherent chemical and physical properties of the hazardous substances, mainly 
due to the circumstances and location of the incidents may be unpredictable [12].  
In the present study, the rail transportation route of anhydrous liquefied ammonia in 
Malaysia, from the Petronas Fertilizers Kedah (PFK) plant in Gurun to the CCM fertilizer 
facilities in Port Klang, was studied due to the large amount of transported hazardous 
material (35,000 tons/year, 70 trips per year) and potential affected populations along the 
specified route (some of the residential areas and dwellings are located as close as 3 – 6m 
from the track). 
2.2 Behavior of Ammonia Upon Release 
Ammonia is an important chemical for use primarily in the manufacturing of fertilizers 
and also as the starting material for the manufacture of a great variety of chemicals. It is a 
colorless gas, lighter than air and has a very pungent odor. It can be liquefied at 
atmospheric pressure by reducing the temperature to -330C and usually stored and 
transported as a pressurized and/or refrigerated liquid. Typically, ammonia releases into 
the environment can be classified into three types of behaviours under operating 
conditions such as [13]: Pressurized Liquid above its Boiling Point (known as 
superheated liquid), Pressurized Liquid below or at its Boiling Point, and Pressurized Gas 
above its Boiling Point. In this study, the behaviour of ammonia following a rail transport 
accident is expected to be the superheat liquid, based on the case study rail car storage 
temperature and pressure.  
Due to the stored heat energy of the liquid ammonia (also known as sensible heat), some 
of the liquid ammonia will flash to vapour following an incident and upon a release. 
However, depending on the type and location of the leak, flashing may result in two 
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phase release, which will produce a finely dispersed liquid or an aerosol that lead to more 
vapour formation when it vaporizes owing to heat transfer with the entrained air and also 
due to endothermic reactions with moist air. Thus, the fraction of liquid ammonia that 
will flash, calculated from the thermodynamic equation refer to equation 1 below], will 
produce an underestimate of the amount of ammonia that would actually flash to vapor 
and disperse. 
f = Cp (Ts – Tb) / hfg (Equation 1) [14] 
Where: 
• f = fraction of liquid 
• Ts = ammonia storage temperature (K) 
• Tb = boiling temperature of ammonia at ambient temperature (K) 
• Cp = specific heat at constant pressure of the liquid ammonia (J/kg/K) 
• hfg = heat of vaporisation of ammonia (J/kg) 
Experiments carried out, by Johnson (1991) shows that little aerosol formation occurs at 
low levels of superheat, (Ts – Tb) [14]. As the level of superheat increases, the liquid 
discharged starts to break up and changes from a continuous stream of liquid to stream of 
liquid droplets, the higher the superheated level, the higher the extent of the aerosol 
formation.  
In this study, an assumption is made that all the liquid ammonia released will flash to 
form an aerosol and vapour mixture, which is considered to be the worst case 
consequence possible following an accidental release of ammonia.  
2.3 SAFETI Software Description 
Consequence modelling is an essential step of the overall QRA process and is used to 
predict the behaviour of hazardous incidents. There are many software models available 
to calculate the consequences from an incident; most of these models estimate the 
quantities of material that will be released, the resulting behaviour of the material 
released and the extent of damage expressed in terms of distance to certain effect levels. 
In this study, the Software for the Assessment of Flammable, Explosive and Toxic 
Impacts (SAFETI) developed by Det Norske Veritas [15] has been used to analyse the 
physical effects of ammonia gas releases following a leak or rupture from the rail car 
tank, and the subsequent damage posed by the release to the surrounding people.  
There are three basic models provided in SAFETI to determine the release characteristics 
(an instantaneous release, a release through a sharp edged hole, and a release through a 
pipe). Used alone or in combination these models can determine the release 
characteristics of holes in tanks, pipe leaks, relief valve and bursting disc releases, flange 
leaks, tank ruptures and so on. For the dispersion modeling of a cloud at all points of 
interest, SAFETI uses the self-embodied Unified Dispersion Model (UDM), which uses a 
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number of models (i.e. the turbulent jet phase, dense turbulent plume phase, slumping 
dense and passive dispersion phase) with each applicable in its own range and match the 
cloud parameters as the program changes between models. The UDM model within the 
SAFETI software package have been subject to detailed verification and validation 
against field experiments as well as other models by Witlox and Holt [16 – 20]. Turbulent 
jet phase is the first stage that a release may pass through, where the actual conditions of 
release (velocity or expansion energy) determine how rapidly air is entrained. Dense 
turbulent plume phase is the second stage, which is a mixture of the initial turbulence 
stage and dense cloud behaviour. During this phase the release is still entraining air at a 
rate determined by the initial turbulence but it has started to spread laterally over the 
ground due to its greater density than the ambient air. Eventually the cloud begins to 
behave as a purely dense cloud and in this third stage (slumping dense) the rate of 
entrainment as well as the spreading is purely determined by dense cloud behavior. The 
fourth stage is when the ambient atmospheric turbulence is the dominant influence on 
entrainment and spreading and the behavior is that of a passive release.  
3.0 Methodology 
The consequence modeling begins with the release of transported ammonia from the rail 
car tank, either due to the car tank failure from accident forces or due to the relief valve 
being opened, owing to high pressures caused by an external fire. The following is a 
simple three-step procedure adopted in this study based on the approach identified by 
Rhyne [5] and is further illustrated in Figure 1: 
 
Figure 1. Consequence Modeling Procedure Adopted  
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1. Definition of the source term, which deals with the release mode and the amount 
released 
2. Exposure assessment, which deals with the extent of the exposure to people due to 
the source term; and  
3. The assessment of health effect of people exposed to the source term 
3.1 Release Modes 
In this study, the release modes have been determined (from failure frequency analysis) 
as the types of accident events, which could occur as a result of a rail accident (train 
collisions or derailments). The accident events considered are related to railcar tank 
crush, puncture, and impact releases on the tank head, tank shell, liquid valve, gas valve, 
valve dome and man way of the tank [9]. 
Windspeed at 1m height from 
ground level  
1.5 m/s, 3.0 m/s, 5.0 m/s and 9.0 m/s  
Wind direction  North, North-East, East, South-East, South-West, 
West, North-West  
Pasquill stability  B, D and F  
Average temperature  27°C (300 K)  
Relative humidity  82% 
Table 1. Selected Meteorological Conditions 
  
 
Percentage of Occurrence of Each Combination of Windspeed/Atmospheric 
Stability at a Height of 1m  
Direction 3.0 m/s B  1.5 m/s D  5.0 m/s D  9.0 m/s D  1.5 m/s F  
N 3.392 0.975 2.104 0.145 9.617 
NE 1.490 0.846 3.544 0.054 6.077 
E 1.877 0.590 2.039 0.060 5.431 
SE 2.097 0.446 0.797 0.066 2.661 
S 5.153 0.389 1.132 0.200 3.225 
SW 7.256 0.363 7.143 0.202 2.448 
W 5.466 0.335 4.103 0.228 2.535 
NW 4.218 0.655 0.839 0.149 6.661 
Table 2. Weather Probabilities 
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Meteorological data, such as wind speed and direction, Pasquill stability, temperature, 
and relative humidity form part of the initial conditions of the releases, and thus 
considered as part of the definition of the source term. Pasquill stability is usually 
measured using the Pasquill-Gifford Scale, ranging from A to F, with A being most 
unstable atmospheric condition and F being most stable atmospheric condition [21]. 
Table 1 shows the meteorological conditions while Table 2 presents the weather 
probabilities adopted in this consequence analysis, which are based on similar 
meteorological conditions that used in the analysis carried out by the Liberty Risk 
Services Malaysia (LRSM) [13]. Noted that the weather probabilities are averaged for 
both night and day over a 24-hour period assuming a 50:50 split between night and day. 
Sensitivity analysis was also carried out to identify the impacts of atmospheric conditions 
on ammonia gas dispersions, where a temperature range between 150C and 350C, and a 
relative humidity range between 60% and 90% were analyzed. 
3.2 Discharge Modeling 
The aim of the discharge modeling is to go from the initial conditions to predict the final 
state of the release as the material emerges into the atmosphere following an accidental 
release. For all the case study scenarios modeled (same as that used in the previous 
failure frequency analysis [9]), the program predicts the condition of ammonia upon 
discharge until the release has expanded down to atmosphere pressure. The initial 
conditions that have been set as inputs within the program are as follow:  
Inventory of release  = 20000 kg (i.e. rail car storage capacity)  
Storage temperature  = 300 K (i.e. above the boiling point of ammonia)  
Leak source  = modeled as a vapor release (i.e. behavior upon release)  
Surface Type  = Dry Soil (i.e. ground surface conditions following a 
release)  
Surface Roughness  = 0.17 (i.e. rougness of surface following a release with 
default value of 0.17 representing residential areas, 
industrial sites, woods, etc.)  
Atmospheric Pressure  = 101.3 kN/m2  
Atmospheric 
Temperature  
= 300 K  
Three different hole sizes, i.e. 25mm, 100mm and tank ruptures have been assumed to 
represent the distributions of possible release size [9]. The 25mm and 100mm hole sizes 
are modeled as continuous releases, while the rupture scenario is considered as 
instantaneous releases. The flow rates calculated within the program represent constant 
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release rates, which are conservative, compared to reality, in which the flow rate will 
decrease with decreasing pressure and inventory.  
3.3 Dispersion Modeling 
In general, there are four distinct stages that an ammonia release may go through upon a 
release (i.e. turbulent jet, dense turbulent plume phase, slumping dense plume phase, and 
passive dispersion phase). Each of these stages is modeled in SAFETI through smoothly 
matched models using a simple form of concentration profile to cover all stages for a 
release [22]. The dispersions of ammonia are modeled based on each case study scenario, 
adopted in the failure frequency analysis [9]. 
3.4 Toxic Effect Modeling 
Ammonia is difficult to ignite in the open air as its flame is unstable and cannot 
propagate itself. Though explosions can occur in flammable mixtures in vessels or 
enclosed spaces, the ignition is difficult and the possibility of an explosion in the open air 
is generally discounted. Therefore, ammonia is not considered a significant fire and/or 
explosion hazard. In this study, emphasis is given on the toxic effects of ammonia. The 
toxic effect consequence models within SAFETI use the output from the dispersion 
models to calculate the effects on people (or effect zone), given the specified release and 
weather conditions. Toxic consequences are expressed as one set of results, which give 
the variation in fatality risk with distance from the release point. In this study, the 
Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health (IDLH) exposure limits and the “Probit 
Equation” (refer equation 2 below), incorporated within SAFETI program are used to 
determine the toxic effects of ammonia. 
Y = k1 + k2 ln V (Equation 2) [21] 
Where: 
• Y = the probit variable 
• k1 and k2 = probit parameters 
• V = causative variable 
4.0 Results and Discussions 
4.1 Toxic Effect of Ammonia Upon Release 
Probit function is a normally distributed function with a mean of 5.0 and a variance of 
1.0. A probit of 5.0 corresponds to 50% fatalities, 3.36 to 5% fatalities and 6.64 to 95% 
fatalities. The corresponding probit numbers for all the scenarios modeled in the case 
study, calculated within the SAFETI program, are shown from Figure 2 to Figure 7. 
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Figure 2. Collision Crushing Tank Scenario - 25mm Leak 
 
Figure 3. Collision Crushing Tank Scenario - 100mm Leak 
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Figure 4. Collision Crushing Tank Scenario - Rupture 
 
Figure 5. Detrailment Crushing Tank Scenario - 25mm Leak 
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Figure 6. Derailment Crushing Tank Scenario - 100mm Leak 
 
Figure 7. Derailment Crushing Tank Scenario – Rupture 
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4.2 Effects of Atmospheric Conditions on Ammonia 
Dispersions  
 
Distances from the Centre of the Railway Track to the IDLH Exposure 
Limits for Ammonia Gas Releases (meter)  
Windspeed 3 m/s, PasquillStability B Windspeed 5 m/s, Pasquill Stability D 
Atmospheric
Temperature 
(C°) 
CIH 
25mm 
leak case  
CIH 
100mm 
leak case  
CIH 
rupture 
case 
CIH 
25mm 
leak case  
CIH 
100mm 
leak case  
CIH 
rupture 
case 
15 102.9 408.6 835.4 171.4 713.2 1972.0 
20 103.6 412.8 840.4 172.3 721.8 1989.1 
25 104.2 420.4 852.0 174.2 729.6 2005.8 
30 105.7 432.5 859.2 179.7 743.2 2022.6 
35 106.1 437.5 866.2 181.6 749.0 2039.2 
Table 3. Effects of Temperature on Ammonia Gas Dispersions 
 
Figure 8. Effects of Temperature on Ammonia Gas Dispersions 
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Distances from the Centre of the Railway Track to the IDLH Exposure Limits 
for Ammonia Gas Releases (meter)  
Windspeed 3 m/s, PasquillStability B Windspeed 5 m/s, Pasquill Stability D 
Relative 
Humidity 
(%) 
CIH 
25mm 
leak case  
CIH 
100mm 
leak case  
CIH 
rupture 
case 
CIH 
25mm 
leak case  
CIH 
100mm 
leak case  
CIH 
rupture 
case 
60 105.3 448.3 831.1 180.0 749.4 1998.2 
70 105.1 442.9 844.4 179.7 749.0 2004.9 
80 104.8 432.0 854.7 175.2 731.1 2012.1 
90 104.5 423.0 854.8 174.6 732.8 2012.3 
95 104.2 429.7 859.9 174.5 726.6 2070.2 
Table 4. Effects of Humidity on Ammonia Gas Dispersions 
 
Figure 9. Effects of Humidity on Ammonia Gas Dispersions 
Table 3 and Figure 8 show the effects of temperature on the dispersions of ammonia for a 
temperature range between 150C and 350C whilst Table 4 and Figure 9 show the effects 
of humidity on the gas dispersion modeling of ammonia releases for a humidity range of 
between 60% and 95%. It should be noted that the sensitivity analysis was carried out 
using the following three failure scenarios as representative cases with two weather 
categories; wind speeds of 30 m/s and 5.0 m/s with Pasquill stability class, B and D, 
respectively: 
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• Collision Impact Force Fails Tank Head (CIH) – 25mm hole leak 
• Collision Impact Force Fails Tank Head (CIH) – 100mm hole leak 
• Collision Impact Force Fails Tank Head (CIH) – tank rupture  
The results from Table 3 shows that the ammonia gas dispersion distances from the 
centre of the railway track to its IDLH exposure limits (i.e. concentration of 500ppm) 
increases with increasing atmospheric temperature. The change in the gas dispersion 
distances from the centre of the track varies from about 3 – 10m for the 25mm leak case, 
29 – 36m for the 100mm leak case and 31 – 67m for the rupture case, depending on the 
wind speed and atmospheric stability. The results indicate that ammonia gases released at 
higher atmospheric temperatures will disperse larger distances with significant levels of 
toxic concentrations. However, the effects of temperature on the ammonia gas dispersion 
are only minimal for the temperature range considered in the analysis, with an increase in 
the dispersion distances by about 3 – 7% only for the scenarios analyzed. Figure 8 also 
indicates that the ammonia gas dispersion distances are greater for wind speeds of 5 m/s 
at Pasquill Stability D compared to wind speeds of 3 m/s at Pasquill Stability B, due to 
the higher wind speed and more stable atmospheric conditions associated with the 
former, resulting in less mixing and entrainment of air during the gas dispersion, hence 
the gas is dispersed greater distances with significant levels of toxic concentration before 
being dilution to concentrations not harmful to people.  
Table 4 shows that the ammonia gas dispersion distances from the centre of the railway 
track to its IDLH exposure limits (i.e. concentration of 500ppm) decreases with 
increasing atmospheric humidity for the 25mm and 100mm leak scenarios but increases 
with increasing atmospheric humidity for the rupture scenario. The change in the gas 
dispersion distances from the centre of the track varies from about 1 – 6m for the 25mm 
leak case, 19 – 23m for the 100mm leak case and 29 – 72m for the rupture case, 
depending on the wind speed and atmospheric stability. Figure 9 shows that the effects of 
humidity on the ammonia dispersion results are only minimal for the humidity range 
considered in the analysis, with a difference in the dispersion distances by about 0.5 – 6% 
for the scenarios analyzed. Figure 9 also indicates that the ammonia gas dispersion 
distances is greater for wind speeds of 5 m/s at Pasquill Stability D compared to wind 
speeds of 3 m/s at Pasquill Stability B. Thus, the gas is dispersed greater distances before 
being dilution to concentrations not harmful to people.  
5.0 Conclusions 
Based on the IDLH exposure limits for ammonia (i.e. 500ppm) and the toxic equations 
incorporated in the SAFETI software packages, the consequence modeling dispersion 
results show that ammonia gases disperses fairly large distances with significant levels of 
toxic concentrations before the process of dilution to a less harmful concentration. Thus, 
most of the surrounding populations along the railway track will be subjected to a high 
exposure of toxicant following the releases of ammonia due to the rail accident (collision 
or derailment). It is suggested that the clearance zone for residential areas and industries 
specified by the Malaysian National Railway, which is 15m from the track, should be 
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reviewed in order to take into consideration the consequences resulting from the 
transported materials. Besides, the results also demonstrate the need for the proper 
planning and operations on the transportation of the ammonia cargoes from the PFK plan 
to the storage facilities in Port Klang. Priority should be given for moving the ammonia 
transported train through populated areas as quickly as possible. This will help to 
minimize the exposure to these people since the risks from the ammonia cargoes are only 
present when the transport vehicle passes through the populated area and at other times 
the risks are absent, since the hazards are not present.  
Sensitivity analysis carried out in the study identified the impacts of atmospheric 
conditions on ammonia gas dispersions. The consequence modeling results indicates and 
increases in the ammonia gas dispersion distances for releases at higher atmospheric 
temperatures or lower atmospheric humidity. However, further analysis of the effects 
atmospheric humidity in the ammonia gas dispersions is required to determine the 
differences in the trend for the 25mm and 100mm leak cases compared to the rupture 
case. The influence of the atmospheric conditions on the ammonia gas dispersion results 
are however, only minimal for the range considered in the analysis. Nonetheless, the 
effects are expected to be more significant in surrounding where the differences in 
temperature and/or humidity are more extreme; i.e. in countries with more diverse change 
in atmospheric conditions than in Malaysia.  
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